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Zielinski: Attorney Fees as Necessaries of Life

ATTORNEY FEES AS NECESSARIES OF LIFE:
EXPANDING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM'S
ACCESS TO SAFETY AND JUSTICE
Angela Zielinski

Roger follows Anne to and from work. He makes harassing
and threatening phone calls to her during her shift. When Anne
arrives home in the evening, Roger tells Anne that she is
worthless and stupid. While Anne prepares their dinner, Roger
reminds her that she is lucky to have a husband like him to take
care of her because no one else would. Roger becomes more and
more angry as Anne remains silent. He jumps up from his chair
and enters the kitchen. He viciously hits and kicks Anne until
she repeats how stupid she is and how lucky she is to be with
him. Once again, Anne ends up in the local emergency room.
Now she has a splint on her wrist.
Anne imagines what her life would be like without Roger.
Roger threatens to kill her if she leaves. Despite his
threats, Anne spent two nights in a local shelter, but she
returned home when Roger convinced her that he loved her. He
said he would try hard to change.
Yet, the violence continues, and Anne now thinks about
getting a temporary restraining order, even a divorce. She made
an appointment with an attorney to discuss her options, but the
attorney wanted a retainer. Roger would be furious when he
found out that Anne paid the attorney, and she could never
deliver the money without Roger noticing. He keeps track of
money just like he keeps track of Anne. The attorney suggested
that Anne contact the local Legal Services office. Anne phoned
Legal Services and was informed that even though Anne's
income from her retail sales position put her well within the
requisite income guidelines for assistance, Roger's considerable
salary as an engineer would mean that their incomes would
likely be calculated together, and she would be ineligible for
legal assistance.
Anne was also told that in certain
circumstances, Legal Services could take cases like hers if her
access to the family's income was restricted or there existed an
emergency situation. But even if she met the income guidelines
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or the circumstantial exceptions, the backlog of domestic
violence cases was very long. Anne was added to their waiting
list.
She is afraid to wait much longer. Anne is more and more
terrified of Roger. Yet, she has no money to seek the advice of a
private attorney.
Anne is trapped in her violent life.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Montana Supreme Court faces the opportunity to
provide victims of domestic violence 1 increased access to justice
in the Montana courts. In Missoula YWCA v. Bard,2 the court
will determine whether attorney services are a "'necessary
article' when they are provided to a wife to obtain orders of
protection from an abusive spouse, thereby obligating the abuser

1. In the United States, 96% of all domestic violence victims are women.
Telephone Interview with Kathy Sewell, Services Coordinator of the Montana Coalition
Against Domestic and Sexual Violence, in Helena, Mont. (February 3, 1999). In
Montana, the latest statistics show that over 10,000 women received assistance for
domestic violence, and 170 men were served. Id. As the number of women victimized by
domestic assaults is greater than the number of men or those in gay or lesbian
relationships who report such incidents, the author will refer to domestic violence
victims as women and batterers as men. This Comment does not intend to minimize the
pain and injury men suffer when subjected to domestic violence, and the author
recognizes the injustice of domestic violence whether the victim is male or female.
2. See No. 98-256 (Mont. filed July 8, 1998). This case is scheduled for oral
argument before the Montana Supreme Court on April 12, 1999 at the University of
Montana School of Law. Mr. Jon Ellingson, a Missoula attorney, assisted Ms. Julia
Marquis in dissolution proceedings and in obtaining two orders of protection against her
abusive husband, Allen Bard. Appellant's Brief at 3-6, Bard (No. 98-256). Ms. Marquis
alleged that her husband threatened to kill her if she became involved with another
man. Appellant's Brief at 4, Bard (No. 98-256). Using anger and intimidation, he went
to her workplace and begged her to believe that he would change. Appellant's Brief at 4,
Bard (No. 98-256). Finally, he said he would leave her alone if she would have sex with
him. Appellant's Brief at 4, Bard (No. 98-256). Julia Marquis died (from causes
unrelated to the abuse), and on November 3, 1997, Mr. Ellingson filed a complaint
alleging that his client's abusive husband, Allen Bard, was liable for his wife's attorney
fees as necessaries of life. Appellant's Brief at 2, Bard (No. 98-256). The Third District
Court of Powell County dismissed the case after concluding that there was no set of facts
on which Mr. Ellingson could prevail. Opinion and Order at 2, Ellingson v. Bard, No. DV
97-93 (Dist. Ct. Third Jud. Dist. March 5, 1998). Mr. Ellingson appealed, and donated
all interest in the proceeds of the case to the Missoula YWCA. Appellant's Brief at 2,
Bard (No. 98-256). Montana Legal Services and the Missoula Family Violence Council
filed amicus briefs. Bard argues that he is not liable for his wife's attorney fees because
they were not necessaries of life under Montana law, citing primarily In re Marriage of
White, 218 Mont. 343, 708 P.2d 267 (1985). Respondent's Brief at 2, Bard (No. 98-256).
In addition, Bard concludes that Mr. Ellingson has other means at his disposal to obtain
payment. Respondent's Brief at 8, Bard (No. 98-256).
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for payment of the attorney fees so incurred."3 Put another way,
the court must decide whether someone in Anne's situation can
offer a private attorney the ability to recoup the value of her
legal assistance as a "necessary article" for which a violent
husband like Roger is liable.
Necessaries of life may be defined as "things indispensable,
4
or things proper and useful, for the sustenance of human life."
Black's Law Dictionary expands upon this general statement:
Necessaries consist of food, drink, clothing, medical attention, and
a suitable place of residence ... However, liability for necessaries
is not limited to articles required to sustain life; it extends to
articles which would ordinarily be necessary and suitable, in view
of the rank, position, fortune, earning capacity, and mode of living
of the individual involved. 5

The "doctrine of necessities" 6 dictates that in a marital
relationship, each spouse must provide the other with these
necessary items.7 For example, one spouse must pay the other
spouse's medical bills.8 If the spouses are living apart due to the
husband's fault or by consent, the husband remains liable for his
wife's medical and dental expenses.9
3. Appellant's Brief at 1, Bard (No. 98-256). While the issue in Bard involves
orders of protection, this Comment argues that a violent spouse should be responsible for
his victim's attorney fees whether incurred to obtain an order of protection or a
dissolution of marriage.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1029 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Id. See also 41 C.J.S. Husbandand Wife § 52 (1991) (the concept of necessaries
is "elastic."). Necessaries are not limited to food, drink, clothing, washing, education,
shelter, and medical attention. Spousal liability for necessaries has been "expanded to
include those things needed and suitable to the rank and condition of the spouses and
the style of life they have adopted." See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husbandand Wife § 200 (1995).
What constitutes necessaries should be decided on a case by case basis by considering
the "means, ability, social position, and circumstances of both husband and wife." Id.
But see Yeiser v. Lowe, 69 N.W. 847, 848 (Neb. 1897) (typical of early case law which
limited necessaries to "food, drink... instruction, and a competent place of residence.").
6. See Cole v. Adams, 289 S.E.2d 918, 919-20 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (Necessaries
"are those things which are essential to [a wife's] health and comfort according to the
rank and fortune of the husband.").
7. Traditionally, the husband was primarily liable for providing his wife the
necessities of life. See McQuay v. McQuay, 86 Mont. 535, 538, 284 P. 532, 533 (1930).
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1029 (6th ed. 1990) ("one who sells goods to a wife or
child may charge the husband or father if the goods are required for their sustenance or
support."). But equal protection challenges have imposed liability on husbands and
wives jointly. See generally St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Bowles, 836 P.2d 1123, 1128
(Kan. 1992); see also Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Husband is
Primarilyor Solely Liable for Necessaries Furnished Wife, 20 A.L.R. 4TH 196 (1981).

8.
9.

See McQuay, 86 Mont. at 538, 284 P. at 533.
See Kerner v. Eastern Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 123 A.2d 333, 379-80 (Md.
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Similarly, Montana law mandates spousal responsibility for
necessaries of life. 10
Both spouses are equally liable for
necessary expenses. 1 ' The statute provides that "expenses for
necessaries of the family and of the education of the children are
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or
either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly
or separately."1 2 Montana law broadly defines necessary articles
for which a spouse is liable. Necessaries include:
All such goods and services as are reasonably required to provide
for the health, welfare, comfort, and education of the married
person, his spouse, and minor children, taking into consideration
the earnings,
resources, and general standard of living of such
13
person.

Applying Montana's statutes and the dictionary definition
to Anne's circumstances, it may be logically concluded that
Anne's personal safety is vital to her health, welfare, and
comfort. Her safety is imperative to a "suitable" place of
residence and surely an article which is necessary in any mode
of living. In order to ensure her safety, Anne must remove
herself from her violent husband. Consequently, an attorney's
services should be deemed necessaries of life when they are
14
reasonably required to provide for a domestic violence victim's
health, welfare, and comfort by way of an order of protection or a
marital dissolution. Because these are necessaries of life for
which her spouse, Roger, is responsible under § 40-2-106 of the
Montana Code, he should be responsible for payment of the
attorney fees incurred to provide Anne with these necessary
items.
Part II of this comment provides a historical overview of
domestic violence and the resulting problems within the
1956).
10. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 (1997).
11. See id. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210, which defines necessaries for the
purpose of MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106, was enacted in 1975. See 1975 Mont. Laws ch.
293 § 11. The statute was intended to hold both spouses responsible for providing
necessaries of life, which were delineated as goods and services reasonably required for a
spouse's health, welfare, comfort, and education. See id.
12. Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-106 (1997).
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 (1997).
14. For the sake of variety, the author uses the terms "domestic violence,"
"spousal assault," and "battered" interchangeably to describe victims, and, likewise,
"violent husband" and "batterer" are used interchangeably to describe the violent actor.
Note that spousal assault includes causing apprehension of bodily injury as well as
purposeful or negligent bodily injury. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-206 (1997).
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national and Montana judicial systems. Part III addresses the
inadequacy of Montana's statutory provision for attorney fees in
domestic violence cases. Part IV presents the preferable and
viable option of awarding attorney fees as necessaries of life in
domestic violence cases where a violent husband threatens his
wife's health, welfare, and comfort. Part V emphasizes the need
for pro bono representation in domestic violence cases, and
argues that designating legal services as necessaries of life will
expand the recruitment and retention of pro bono attorneys for
these cases. The discussion concludes that Montana law clearly
supports the designation of legal fees as necessaries of life in
certain domestic matters, and the Montana Supreme Court
should recognize this designation to increase a domestic violence
victim's access to safety and justice.
II. LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. Domestic Violence: The Lingering Problem
Domestic violence in the United States is responsible for
over two million injuries to women per year. 15 This figure may
be as high as six million. 16 In fact, domestic violence is the
"single greatest cause of injury to women." 17 Muggings, car
accidents, and rapes combined do not victimize the number of
women seen in emergency rooms due to domestic violence
8
injuries.'
The history of domestic violence must be addressed to
understand domestic violence today. 19
Current domestic
violence problems stem from lingering attitudes toward women.
While the history of domestic violence is far beyond the scope of

15. See Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and
Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983 (1989).
16. See Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses To and
Rationales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape & Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 80
(1994).
17. Sewell, supra note 15, at 983 (citing P.A. LANGAN & C.A. INNES, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 3 (1986)).

18. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 80 (citing Matthew Litsky, Note, Explaining
the Legal System's Inadequate Response to the Abuse of Women: A Lack of Coordination,
8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 149 (1990)).
19. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 83-84 (citing R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL
DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 23 (1979); Wendy

Rae Willis, The Gun is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title II of the Violence
Against Women Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 2197, 2206-07 (1992)).
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this article, some background is illustrative. In early Greek and
Roman times, women were classified as property, and a man
could beat, divorce, or murder his wife if she threatened his
honor or property rights.20 Early Christian attitudes supported
death by mutilation or stoning for a woman lacking docility,
chastity, and passivity. 2 1 Later, the Catholic Rules of Marriage

stated a husband could sharply scold, bully and terrify his wife
when she committed an offense against him. 22 Feudal England

forbade women from property ownership and thus denied her
status and political power. 23 Additionally, the doctrine of
coveture dictated that a husband could beat a misbehaving
wife. 24 In nineteenth-century America, women gained property
rights, and a few courts punished domestic violence. 25 However,
legal recourse was limited to women of means and the ability to
26
withstand the resulting humiliation and social retribution.
From 1900 to 1980, domestic violence laws were widely
ignored by the courts and police. 27 As late as 1974, the notion of
"family privacy" prevented the legal system from treating
domestic violence as a serious crime. 28 In effect, this inaction
reinforced men's societal and familial domination over women
and as a result women were widely blamed for provoking their

20. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 84 (citing DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 19, at
34-37.)
21. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 85 (citing Sewell, supra note 15, at 986;
Deuteronomy 25:11-12 (recommending mutilation as punishment for a wife who touched
a man not her husband); Deuteronomy 22:13-21 (relating incident wherein an unmarried
woman not a virgin was stoned to death); ANSON SHUPE ET AL., VIOLENT MEN, VIOLENT
COUPLES 87-89 (1987)).

22. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 85 (1994) (citing Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond
Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 232 n. 144 (1992)).
23. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 86 (citing Salina Szechtman, Wife Abuse:
Women's Duties - Men's Rights, 10 VICTIMOLOGY: INT'L J. 253, 254 (1985)).
24. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 86-87 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *444).
25. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 91-92 (citing LEO KANOWITZ, WOMAN AND THE
LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 40-41 (1969); Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871);
Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458 (1871)).
26. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 92-93 (citing Barbara K Finesmith, Police
Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals for Reform; 14 SETON HALL L.
REV. 74, 80 (1983)).
27. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 94-95 (citing DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 19,
at 64).
28. Lori Heise & Jane Roberts Chapman, Reflections on a Movement: The U.S.
Battle Against Women Abuse, in FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE 257 (Margaret Schuler ed.
1992) [hereinafter FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE].
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29
husbands' abuse.
Even today, judicial attitudes toward domestic violence tend
to be unsympathetic, misguided, and misinformed. 30
For
example, judges may believe that domestic violence problems
are better dealt with by a social service agency. 31 However,
unlike social service agencies, judges have the exclusive
authority to issue binding protective orders and compel law
enforcement agents to protect domestic violence victims. 32 Or, a
judge may be overtly hostile to defensive measures, such as
orders of protection, and refuse to issue or enforce them. 33 Such
hostility may stem from a perceived need to preserve privacy
rights within the home. 34 Additionally, some judges actively
advocate marital reconciliation over intervention in domestic
affairs. 35 Such prejudices likely stem from a lack of judicial
training about battered women and the complications of
36
domestic violence cases.
These judicial views are dangerous to a battered woman.
Domestic violence victims experience decreased self-esteem,
emotional reliance upon the dominant male, and a kind of
"learned helplessness" 37 resulting from inability to predict or
control their batterer's violent actions. 38
The relationship
between the batterer and victim has three phases. 39 First, there

29.

See id.

30. See Sewell, supra note 15, at 1011 (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

55, 57 (1982)).
31. See Sewell, supra note 15, at 1011.
32. See REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 29 (1982).
33. See Sewell, supra note 15, at 1011-12.
34. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 113-14 (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 985 (1991)).
35. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 115 (citing Sandra L. Ryder & Sheryl A.
Kuzmenka, Legal Rape: The Marital Rape Exception, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 405
(1991); Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 223 (Ga. 1985)).
36. See FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE, supra note 28, at 270-71.
37. See Lenore E. Walker, THE BATTERED WOMAN 42-54 (2d ed. 1980).
38. See Cynthia Lynn Barnes, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Concerning Domestic Violence Syndromes to Assist Jury in Evaluating Victim's
Testimony or Behavior, 57 A.L.R. 5TH 315, 329 (1998).

39. See Walker, supra note 37, at 56-57. There has been some controversy
regarding these phases and the corresponding battered woman's syndrome and learned
helplessness. One view challenges the scientific validity of Walker's study. See David L.
Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (1997). In addition, some argue that the "syndrome" characterization of
battered women is laden with a stereotypical view of women as passive, powerless,
victimized, and even crazy, thus hindering explanations for severe actions women may
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exists a tension building stage where minor abusive incidents
cause a victim to accept blame for the batterer's violent
actions. 40 A second phase includes an acute battering incident
where the batterer's uncontrollable rage often results in severe
beatings after which the domestic violence victim suffers denial
of injuries and isolation. 41 Completing the cycle is a loving
phase where the violent husband apologizes and showers his
victim with gifts and attention. 42 A victim may choose to believe
that the man in phase three is the loving and dependable man
she loves, and this phase often results in reconciliation.43
The psychological ramifications of violence and financial
dependence on the batterer make leaving the violent situation
extremely difficult." Often, women must choose whether to be
beaten or to expose themselves and their children to poverty. 45
Furthermore, victims often see no way out of their situation
because the violence may increase when women attempt to
leave.46 A batterer may threaten to harm or ruthlessly track her
or others. 47 A victim may perceive that in the end the batterer
will kill her regardless of her decision to remain in or escape the
48
violent relationship.
If a spousal assault victim makes the difficult, and
take against their batterers. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14
WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 213, 232-34 (1992); Sue E. McClure, Note, The Battered Woman
Syndrome and the Kentucky Criminal Justice System: Abuse Excuse or Legitimate
Mitigation?, 85 KY. L.J. 169, 171-72, 176-77 (1997) (citing Michael Dowd, Dispelling the
Myths About the "Battered Women's Defense": Towards a New Understanding,FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 567, 577 (1992); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to
Domestic Violence, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1193-94 (1993)). Regardless of the controversy
surrounding battered woman's syndrome and its definition, all of these authors agreed
that a battered woman possesses certain characteristics that are integral to a court's
understanding of her actions. The argument that a violent husband is responsible for
providing the victimized spouse with necessaries of life, such as health, welfare, and
comfort, does not depend on how these characteristics are defined or presented.
40. See Walker, supra note 37, at 56-57.
41. See id. at 59-64.
42. See id. at 65-66.
43. See id. at 68-69.
44. See id. at 33-34, 47-48.
45. See FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE, supra note 28, at 288-89.
46. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 101 (citing Lynn Hecht Schafran, Carol Stuart
and the War on Women: What is the Legal Community's Response?, 75 MASs. L. REV. 51
(1990)).
47. See Schelong, supra note 16, at 101 (citing Kathleen Waits, The Criminal
Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the
Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 283 (1985)).
48. See Walker, supra note 37, at 75.
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sometimes dangerous, decision to seek protection from her
spouse, competent legal representation is vital. 49 Competent
legal counsel can increase the victim's awareness of her rights
and help her through the legal red tape in the face of her
husband's threats to take her children, home, and financial
support. 50 In recognition of the importance of legal services to
domestic violence victims, some states have mandated in their
domestic violence statutes that offenders must, if financially
able, provide for the victim's attorney fees and court costs. 51
Permitting award of attorney fees encourages low-income
battered women to seek an attorney's services for protection and
may deter the batterer by providing a form of financial
punishment. 52
B. Montana's Problem
In 1986, Montana created the crime of partner and family
member assault.53 A person commits the offense of partner or
family member assault if the person purposely or knowingly
causes bodily injury to a partner or family member, negligently
causes bodily injury to a partner or family member using a
weapon, or purposely or knowingly causes reasonable
apprehension of bodily injury.M
The Partner and Family
Member Assault Act clarifies arrest powers and promotes arrest
as the preferred response to incidences of domestic violence. 55

49. See id. at 258.
50. See id.
51. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(f) (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:10.II(h) (1997); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 812 (McKinney 1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §
6108(a)(8)(1998); and WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 26.50.060(f) (1998).
52. See Krassnoski v. Rosey, 684 A.2d 635, 638 (Pa. 1996) (awarding fees to pro
bono counsel both encourages victims to take advantage of Pennsylvania's Protection
from Abuse Act and acts as a financial disincentive to deter batterers from violent
conduct). While providing legal assistance as part of a domestic violence statute may
encourage victims to seek the legal advice they require, it seems unlikely that the threat
of fee payment will deter the batterer from his behavior, especially considering the
characteristics of a typical batterer. See Walker, supra note 37, at 24, 35-41. Requiring
a batterer to pay his spouse's legal fees under the doctrine of necessities would
accomplish the goal of affording legal assistance to the victim and abandon an
unrealistic deterrent argument.
53. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 (1997). See also Women's Law Caucus,
University of Montana, Montana's New Domestic Abuse Statutes: A New Response to an
Old Problem, 47 MONT. L. REV. 403, 408 (1986).
54. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(1)(a)-(c) (1997).
55. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2)(a) (1997). See also Women's Law Caucus,
supra note 53, at 409.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

9

210

LAW
REVIEW
Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
60 [1999],
Iss. 1, Art. 9

Vol. 60

Additionally, police officers must provide the assault victim, at
minimum, information about local shelters and the right to file
for an order of protection. 56 Finally, police officers must file a
written report when no arrest occurs.5 7 In essence, Montana's
response to domestic violence "acknowledges the unacceptability
of violence in the home and promotes a system designed to
interrupt and end the cycle of violence."5 8
While Montana's legislative and law enforcement responses
to domestic violence have improved, problems still exist in some
Montana courts. Domestic violence victims often are simply not
believed if there are no visible cuts and bruises or police records
to substantiate the violence. 59 If physical signs of violence are
obvious, the victim may be criticized for not escaping the violent
relationship sooner. 60 Courts of limited jurisdiction handle the
majority of domestic violence cases in Montana, and efforts at
judicial education regarding domestic violence are sometimes
not well accepted. 6 1 Instead of focusing on the offender and the
offense, some courts focus on the victim's behavior and options. 62
When the victim's behavior is scrutinized rather than the
offender's criminal conduct, these courts continue to discount
the criminal aspect of domestic violence. Consequently, judicial
perceptions about domestic violence remain a serious problem in
63
some Montana courts.
Judicial attitudes in Montana reflect the need not only for
more education but also for adequate legal representation for
the domestic violence victim. Unlike other states which provide
payment for legal services required by domestic violence victims,
Montana does not.64 An offender convicted of partner and family
member assault, if able, must pay the victim's "reasonable
56.

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-602 (1997). See also Women's Law Caucus, supra

note 53, at 410.
57. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-601 (1997). See also Women's Law Caucus, supra
note 53, at 410.
58. Women's Law Caucus, supra note 53, at 419.
59. Klaus Sitte, Remarks at the Panel Discussion on Domestic Violence and the
Law sponsored by the University of Montana Women's Law Caucus (Nov. 19, 1998).
60. Id.
61. Judy Wang, Remarks at the Panel Discussion on Domestic Violence and the
Law sponsored by the University of Montana Women's Law Caucus (Nov. 19, 1998).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(5) (1997). But see MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-2115(f) (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:10.II(h) (1997); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 812
(McKinney 1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(a)(8) (1998); and WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
26.50.060(f) (1998).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/9

10

1999

ATTORNEY
FEES
AS NECESSARIES
OF
LIFE
Zielinski:
Attorney
Fees as Necessaries of
Life

211

actual medical, housing, wage loss, and counseling costs." 65
Legal costs are absent from the list.
While amending Montana's statute to include the offender's
responsibility for legal fees may seem like an appropriate
solution, it is not an adequate answer. The legal fees covered by
such an amendment would only cover the costs of orders of
protection. If an attorney's assistance is not required, there are
usually no costs for these. 66 The amendment would not cover
the legal costs of marital dissolution, which can be the ultimate
solution to the problem of family violence.
Rather than amending the Partner and Family Member
Assault Act, all legal protection expenses should be designated
as necessaries of life in domestic violence cases. Then, the
violent husband would be liable under Montana law for all legal
fees associated with the domestic violence victim's access to
67
health, welfare, and comfort.
III. INADEQUACY OF MONTANA'S STATUTORY PROVISION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES

Currently, Montana law does not mandate spousal liability
for attorney fees in dissolution proceedings. 68 Section 40-4110(1) states:
The court from time to time after considering the financial
resources of both parties, may order a party to pay a reasonable
amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending
any proceeding under chapters 1 and 4 and for professional fees,
including sums for legal and professional services rendered and
costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or
after entry of judgment. The court may order that the amount be
paid directly to the professional, who may enforce the order in the
professional's name.

The purpose of the statute is to "ensure that both parties
have timely and equitable access" to the courts for dissolution
69
and other marital proceedings.
The statue is inadequate for victims of domestic violence in

65. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(5) (1997).
66. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-204(8) (1997). See also Women's Law Caucus,
supra note 53, at 416-18. For a discussion of when an attorney's services are necessary
to obtain an order of protection, see infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
67. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2-106, -205, -210 (1997).
68. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-110 (1997).
69. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-110(2) (1997).
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three respects. First, the requisite procedure for obtaining
attorney fees in a dissolution proceeding may deter a victim
from seeking fees because she may have to testify regarding the
violence at a hearing where the batterer is likely to be present.
Second, the discretionary award of fees may impede an
attorney's ability to recoup fees. Third, the statute fails to cover
attorney fees incurred for orders of protection. These three
drawbacks are obstacles to the victim's recruitment and
retention of a pro bono attorney and her access to safety.
A. Procedure
A spouse may be ordered to pay the other spouse's attorney
fees before, during, or after dissolution proceedings. 70 The
standard for an award of attorney fees is as follows:
The petitioning party must make a showing of necessity .... The
award must be reasonable, and must be based on competent
evidence .... Reasonableness is shown by means of a hearing
allowing for oral testimony, the
introduction of exhibits, and the
71
opportunity to cross-examine.
In short, the award must be 1) based on necessity, 2)
reasonable, and 3) supported by competent evidence. 72 The
district court must conduct a separate hearing following
dissolution proceedings to determine whether the award of fees
is reasonable. 73 The district court's determination will be
disturbed only upon an abuse of discretion, 74 that is, if the
award of fees is not supported by substantial evidence. 75 For
example, an award of attorney fees will be reversed if the
district court declines to hear evidence relating to the necessity
and reasonableness of the award. 76 This determination is
properly made only when a spouse is afforded the opportunity to

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-110(1) (1997).
71. In re Marriage of Laster, 197 Mont. 470, 479, 643 P.2d 597, 602 (1982) (citation
omitted) (holding that testimony and an uncontested affidavit showing the wife's costs
met the necessity requirement).
72. See Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 282 Mont. 461, 466, 938 P.2d 684, 687 (1997) (citation
omitted) (reversing award of attorney fees for failure to provide substantial evidence of
necessity).
73. See id. at 466, 938 P.2d at 687-88.
74. See In re Marriage of Lee, 282 Mont. 410, 423, 938 P.2d 650, 658 (1997)
(holding husband not liable for attorney fees because both parties lacked financial
resources).
75. See Pfeifer, 282 Mont. at 465-66, 938 P.2d at 687.
76. See In re Marriage of Cox, 266 Mont. 67, 74, 878 P.2d 903, 908 (1994).
70.
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present evidence and refute the other spouse's claim for an
award of fees. 77 In determining the necessity of an award, the
district court must consider more than the parties' respective
financial resources. 78 The court does not elaborate on what
exactly meets these requirements, but it does mandate evidence
above and beyond their financial situation. 79 Under Pfeifer v.
Pfeifer, the parties are required to produce evidence which
would clarify how their financial situation leads to and supports
an award of attorney fees.80
A woman seeking a divorce from a violent husband is taking
a great step towards safety and a better life. For victims of
domestic violence, dissolution proceedings should not be made
more difficult than necessary. Yet, § 40-4-110 does exactly this.
The statute requires a victim, after obtaining her divorce and
finally ending a violent relationship, to go through a separate
hearing to show substantial evidence as to the reasonableness
81
and necessity of her request for attorney fees.
To meet the Pfeifer standard, a spousal assault victim may
have to reveal the household violence to show the substantial
evidence necessary to meet these necessity and reasonableness
Evidence of domestic violence can show the
requirements.
emotional and financial problems that would clarify her
financial situation8 2 and support an award of fees.
But the victim would be forced to discuss the violence in
front of strangers with her violent husband not only present, but
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine her and refute her
claim.8 3 This procedure postpones the parting, giving the
violent husband more time to physically or mentally harm his
spouse by venting his anger or begging for forgiveness and
reconciliation. In effect, this could afford the desperate violent
husband another opportunity to humiliate, manipulate, harass,
and even attack his wife.84 This experience would emotionally
drain the victims, many of whom have been threatened with

77. See id. at 74, 878 P.2d at 907.
78. See Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 282 Mont. 461, 466-67, 938 P.2d 684, 688 (1997) ("The
court's statement that it considered the parties' financial resources, without more, is an
insufficient basis upon which to determine that an attorney fee award is necessary.").
79. See id. at 466-67, 938 P.2d at 688.
80. See id. at 467, 938 P.2d at 688.
81. See id. at 466, 938 P.2d at 687-88.
82. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
83. See In re Marriage of Cox, 266 Mont. 67, 74, 878 P.2d 903, 907 (1994).
84. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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greater harm if they leave their husbands and many of whom
remain fearful of the consequences of their decision.8 5
As a result, domestic violence victims, with good reason,
would be deterred from seeking an award of fees. Because a
victim would not likely seek fees under such a procedure, a
private attorney might be less likely to take her case. The
procedural aspects of § 40-4-110 end up depriving the victim of
86
adequate legal representation.
B. The Court's Discretion
The award of attorney fees is largely discretionary with the
district court,8 7 not mandatory.8 8 In addition to showing that
the award is necessary, reasonable, and supported by competent
evidence,8 9 an attorney seeking fees must also show that she
represented the prevailing party. 90
A prevailing party is not necessarily the party who is
awarded a money judgment, and often there may be no
prevailing party.9 1 For instance, where the wife prevails on the
payment of medical and travel expenses, and her husband
prevails on child support and washer and dryer issues, no party
92
prevails.
The discretionary nature of attorney fee awards makes it
difficult for an attorney to determine whether to take a domestic
relations case on a pro bono basis. If the spousal assault victim
is unable to clarify her financial situation because she does not
wish to discuss the household violence, it is within the court's
discretion to withhold a fee award for lack of substantial
evidence of necessity and reasonableness. Alternatively, if the
spousal assault victim is not the prevailing party in the
dissolution, the court not only may, but probably must, deny an

85. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
86. The recruitment and retention of pro bono attorneys for abuse victims is
increasingly important. See infra notes 220-228 and accompanying text.
87. See In re Marriage of Lee, 282 Mont. 410, 423, 938 P.2d 650, 658 (1997).
88. See In re Marriage of Carlson, 214 Mont. 209, 218-19, 693 P.2d 496, 501 (1984);
In re Support of Rockman, 217 Mont. 498, 502, 705 P.2d 590, 592 (1985).
89. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
90. See In re Marriage of Jensen, 223 Mont. 434, 441, 727 P.2d 512, 517 (1986)
(declining to award fees).
91. See In re Marriage of Herbert, 255 Mont. 69, 71-2, 840 P.2d 584, 586 (1992)
("There is no prevailing party where both parties gain a victory but also suffer a loss.").
92. See id. at 71-72, 840 P.2d at 586.
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award of attorney fees. 93 This would probably be the case since
policies of equitable settlement in dissolution proceedings make
it difficult for one spouse to "prevail" over the other.
A wife who obtains primary parenting responsibilities, child
support, and maintenance may not be a prevailing party and
will not receive an attorney fee award should her husband
prevail on other issues such as division of household goods and
property. This uncertainty of payment could deter an attorney
from taking a difficult domestic violence and dissolution of
marriage case at no charge to the client, thus denying the lowincome victim access to competent representation and safety.
C. Orders of Protection
Orders of protection represent an effort by the Montana
legislature to provide for "the safety and protection of all victims
of partner and family member assault, victims of sexual assault
and victims of stalking."94 In 1997, 2,612 partner violence
victims received an order of protection in Montana. 95 These
orders prevent the violent individual from contact with the
victim at home or at work. 96 It is a criminal offense for the
batterer to disobey the court's restrictions. 97 As a result, a
victim of domestic violence "is more likely to be safe from further
98
threats and crimes committed by the offender."
There is currently no provision in Montana law for financial
assistance to those domestic violence victims who require an
attorney's assistance in obtaining an order of protection. 99
Section 40-4-110 provides for the award of attorney fees only in
the case of marital dissolution and related proceedings.
Many domestic violence victims with limited or restricted
economic resources may request an order of protection pro se,
but others need the advice of counsel. 0 0 When a spousal assault
93. See Jensen, 223 Mont. at 441, 727 P.2d at 517.
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-101 (1997). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Missoula Family Violence Council at 2-4, Missoula YWCA v. Bard, No. 98-256 (Mont.
filed July 8, 1998) (providing a summary of current status of orders of protection).
95. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Missoula Family Violence Council at 3, Bard
(No. 98-256).
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-103, -201 (1997).
97.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1997).

98. See
(No. 98-256).
99. See
100. See
(No. 98-256).

Brief Amicus Curiae of the Missoula Family Violence Council at 2, Bard
supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Missoula Family Violence Council at 3, Bard
See also Appellant's Brief at 2, Bard (No. 98-256) (domestic abuse victim
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victim knows that her husband is represented by an attorney,
she may be too frightened or intimidated to appear in court
without legal assistance, and she is likely to require an
attorney's help in obtaining an order of protection. 10 1
A low-income victim could better afford access to safety and
justice if legal services were designated as necessaries of life for
the victims of domestic violence. Under Montana's statutory
scheme, the attorney who helps a domestic violence victim
obtain an order of protection, and thus provides for the victim's
health, welfare, and comfort, 10 2 could be assured payment of
reasonable fees and costs from the violent spouse. The attorney's
services would be necessaries of life for which the spouse is
03
liable.1
IV. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE: LEGAL SERVICES AS NECESSARIES
OF LIFE UNDER

§ 40-2-106

The obstacles posed by § 40-4-110 can be easily avoided.
Designating legal services as necessaries of life offers an
alternative, and preferable, theory on which a pro bono attorney
who represents a domestic violence victim may recover her fees.
If an attorney is able to show that she represented a domestic
10 4
violence victim, providing for her health, welfare, and comfort,
then the court must hold the violent spouse liable for the
attorney's reasonable costs pursuant to spousal and contractual
obligations underlying §§ 40-2-106 and 40-2-205.105
required assistance of counsel in obtaining two orders of protection.)
In Missoula, a combined effort of the Missoula Family Violence Council and the
Crime Victims Advocates located in the City Attorney's Office resulted in a Pro Bono
Program which provides volunteer attorneys to represent indigent victims of domestic
violence at hearings to obtain orders of protection. (These attorneys do not provide
assistance for dissolutions or custody actions.) However, these programs do not serve
other Montana communities, and many spousal assault victims with limited means or
without access to family finances are left without adequate legal assistance to obtain an
order of protection. Telephone Interview with Klaus Sitte, Deputy Director of Montana
Legal Services, in Missoula, Mont. (January 20, 1998); Telephone Interview with Judy
Wang, Chairperson of Missoula Family Violence Council, in Missoula, Mont. (January
24, 1998).
101. Telephone Interview with Klaus Sitte, Deputy Director of Montana Legal
Services, in Missoula, Mont. (January 20, 1998); Telephone Interview with Judy Wang,
Chairperson of Missoula Family Violence Council, in Missoula, Mont. (January 24,
1998).
102. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 (1997).
103.
See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2-106, -205 (1997). See also infra notes 154-158,
163-170 and accompanying text.
104. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 (1997).
105. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2-106, -205 (1997).
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Designating legal services as necessaries of life is a viable
option supported by United States and Montana law. With this
option, more attorneys will take these difficult cases, thereby
expanding the domestic violence victim's access to safety and
justice.
A. Cross-Section of Legal Services as Necessaries of Life in the
United States
National precedent exists for deeming legal services as
necessaries of life in certain circumstances. However, some
states have a history of denying such fees in dissolution actions
and others deny fees in such actions today. Following is an
overview of pertinent law throughout the United States.
1. CriminalActions
Generally, a husband is liable for legal services necessary
for his wife's protection. 10 6 A husband has been held liable for
attorney fees incurred in defending his wife in a criminal
action. 10 7 For example, the New York Court of Appeals held that
legal services rendered to defend a wife against charges of libel,
assault, and grand larceny were chargeable to her husband. 0 8
The court reasoned that "when a wife living with her
husband.., is arrested on a criminal charge or prosecuted in a
civil action which may result in her incarceration, the necessity
for a lawyer may be as urgent and important as the necessity for
a doctor when she is sick." 10 9 In addition, the court stated that
the husband could not avoid the responsibility to furnish legal
services for his wife's protection by "merely providing a house
and eatables." 1 0
Twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court of Colorado
relied on the Elder rationale when holding a husband liable for
legal expenses rendered in defending his wife against murder
charges."'
The court labeled the attorney's services as
necessaries and went on to emphasize that the "suffering and
106. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 201 (1995).
107. See Read v. Read, 202 P.2d 953, 957 (Colo. 1949); Fenters v. Fenters, 231
S.E.2d 741, 743 (Ga. 1977); DuBois v. DeLarm, 578 A.2d 1250, 1256-57 (N.J. 1990);
Elder v. Rosenwasser, 144 N.E. 669, 670 (N.Y Ct. App. 1924).
108. See Elder, 144 N.E. at 669-70.
109. Id. at 670.
110. Id. at 671.
111. See Read, 202 P.2d at 958.
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anguish" that may result from a conviction could be as
112
devastating as "bodily ailments."
2. Divorce Actions
While there is general agreement that legal services are
necessaries of life while the marital relation exists, early case
law reflected the negative response of courts faced with the
question of whether a husband was liable for attorney fees
incurred by the wife in a divorce action. Courts were especially
reluctant when the wife's attorney brought a separate action
against the husband to collect his fees." 3 Courts declined to
award fees in divorce actions primarily because divorce was not
seen as necessary for the wife's protection. According to the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, "it is never necessary for the
safety of the wife, as such, to obtain a divorce from her husband
or resist his obtaining one from her."114 The Arkansas Supreme
Court agreed with this rationale, stating that it could not
understand "how a suit for divorce could be necessary, or
actually afford protection to the wife against personal abuse on
the part of the husband." 115 Finally, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court stated that a husband is required to supply necessaries to
his wife "to sustain her as his wife, and not to provide for her
future condition as a single woman or perhaps as the wife of
116
another man."
However, recognizing divorcing wives' need for access to the
courts and husbands' fair notice that divorce might occur, two
early decisions supported a husband's liability for his wife's
attorney fees incurred in a divorce action. 117 In Texas, an
attorney sued his client's husband for his services rendered prior
to the reconciliation of his client and her husband. 118 The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals acknowledged that the majority of

112. See id. at 957.
113. See Kincheloe v. Merriman, 16 S.W. 578, 579 (Ark. 1891); Sumner v. Mohn, 190
P. 368, 369-70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920); Yeiser v. Lowe, 69 N.W. 847, 848 (Neb. 1897);
Morrison v. Holt, 42 N.H. 478, 482 (N.H. 1861); Clark v. Burke, 27 N.W.22, 23-24 (Wis.
1886). In Bard, the attorney brought a separate action against his client's husband to
collect his fees. See supranote 2.
114. Morrison, 42 N.H. at 480.
115. See Kincheloe, 16 S.W. at 579.
116. See Clark, 27 N.W. at 24.
117. See Ceccato v. Deutschman, 47 S.W. 739, 739-40 (Tex. App. 1898); Gibson v.
Gibson, 122 P. 15, 16 (Wash. 1912).
118. Ceccato, 47 S.W. at 739.
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American jurisdictions did not hold husbands liable for legal fees
associated with divorce proceedings. 119 Yet, the court held the
husband responsible for the attorney fees reasoning that a wife's
right to sue for divorce "would be shorn of all efficacy if she was
denied the means of getting into the court, as would be the effect
in most instances if the husband could not be held liable for the
expenses of the suit."120 Similarly, the Washington Supreme
Court stated that the husband's liability for attorney fees was
"an assumed risk which the husband takes with him from the
marriage altar, and which follows him until death or divorce
12
squares the debt." '
If the attorney fees were necessary for the wife's protection,
22
still other courts permitted a husband's liability for payment.
For instance, the Iowa Supreme Court reasoned that the
husband's liability rested solely on the appearance that a wife's
prosecution or defense, in civil as well as criminal matters, was
123
necessary for her protection.
In later decisions, some courts did designate legal services
in divorce actions as necessaries of life. The California Fifth
District Court of Appeals allowed a wife's attorneys to enforce a
writ of execution against her husband's earnings (despite the
couple's reconciliation), stating that providing legal services and
advancing costs plainly qualified as "common necessaries of life"
for the low-income spouse. 124
The California court cited
precedent declaring that "money awarded to a wife to pay her
attorney fee in a divorce case is as much for her support as

119. Id.
120. Id. In a similar case, where a husband and wife reconciled and the wife's
attorney commenced an action against her husband, the court held that the marital
relationship imposed an implied liability on the husband and the attorney must be paid
if he acted in good faith and there was no evidence of collusion or purpose of oppression
or vindication of a right. Preston v. Johnson, 21 N.W. 606, 607 (Iowa 1884). Four years
later, in another unsuccessful divorce suit, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld Preston
when deciding that the wife's attorney could recover his attorney fees from her husband
because the legal services were necessary. See Clyde v. Peavy, 36 N.W. 883, 884 (Iowa

1888).
121. Gibson, 122 P. at 16.
122. See Thorn v. Kelley, 134 N.W. 2d 545, 549 (Iowa 1965) (holding husband not
liable for wife's attorney fees because she failed to prove husband had been guilty of
"inhuman treatment" and divorce was not granted.) See also Wald v. Wald, 99 N.W. 720,
721 (Iowa 1904); Wick v. Beck, 153 N.W. 836, 843 (Iowa 1915) (reversing husband's
liability for wife's attorney fees as wife failed to show that her attorney's services in a
divorce action were necessary for her protection).
123. See Wick, 153 N.W. at 843.
124. See In re Marriage of Pallesi, 140 Cal Rptr. 842, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
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money for a doctor's fee or a grocery bill."125 Likewise, the New
Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that if the wife instituted the
divorce action in good faith and was unable to afford attorney
fees, and if the husband could afford the fees, then the counsel
fees were included as necessaries for which the husband was
126
responsible.
Other decisions, while not mentioning necessaries
specifically, have found spousal liability for legal services in
divorce actions based on the husband's common law obligation to
127
provide for his wife.
In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court refused to consider
attorney fees associated with a divorce action as necessaries or
"expenses of the family." 28 The Utah court established that
items and services were necessaries of the family if they
"promoted the family." 29 Because divorce disrupts the family
30
unit, attorney fees could not be necessary family expenses.
B. Advantage of the Necessaries of Life Designation
The advantage of the necessaries of life designation is that
third party creditors, such as pro bono attorneys, are more likely
to be paid. The necessaries rule "benefits the providers of goods
and services by assuring them greater certainty of payment
when they extend credit to families." 13' Courts may enforce
these liabilities as necessaries for which each spouse is
responsible on the theory of an agency relationship between
husband and wife or a theory of implied contract. 32 The court
125. Id. (citing Henry v. Henry, 6 Cal. Rptr. 418, 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)). See also
McIntosh v. McIntosh, 26 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
126. See Williams v. Williams, 281 A.2d 273, 275 (N.J. 1971). See also Romeo v.
Romeo, 16 B.R. 531, 536 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981); Weiner v. Weiner, 290 A.2d 307, 309 (N.J.
1972); Pelusio v. Pelusio, 328 A.2d 10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
127. See Paxton v. Porter Superior Court, 467 N.E. 2d 1205, 1207 (Ind. 1984)
(holding husband liable for wife's attorney fees despite the fact that she died before the
divorce was final).
128. See Morrison v. Federico, 232 P.2d 374, 377 (Utah 1951).
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Wis. 1982).
132. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 184 (1995). See also Allen v.
Keating, 517 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Mich. 1994) (agency relationship); McQuay v. McQuay, 86
Mont. 535, 538, 284 P. 532, 533 (1930) (agency relationship); Battle & Sons Funeral
Home v. Chambers, 631 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ohio 1993) (implied contract). A husband and
wife cannot have a true agency relationship. Instead, the power of a wife to obtain
necessaries and bind her husband for payment stems from restitutional power and the
desirability of having a spouse or parent perform family duties. See RESTATEMENT
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may also impose spousal liability when there exists a statute
133
which implicitly or expressly requires payment for necessities.
C. Montana's Constitution,Statutory Scheme and Case Law
Support Legal Services as Necessaries of Life in Domestic
Violence Matters
Fees for legal services rendered in domestic violence
matters must be designated as necessaries of life to avoid the
unnecessary and difficult aspects of § 40-4-110 and to encourage
the recruitment and retention of pro bono counsel to represent
persons of limited or restricted economic means. Montana law
supports legal services as necessaries of life for domestic
violence victims.
1. Constitution
The Montana Constitution states that all individuals are
born free and have specific inalienable rights. 134 These rights
include "a clean and healthful environment and the rights of
pursuing life's basic necessities ... and seeking their safety,
health, and happiness in all lawful ways." 35 Surely, freedom
from violence is essential to safety, health, and happiness.
2. Statutes
36
Generally, spouses are not liable for each other's debts.
However, § 40-2-106 provides that "the expenses for necessaries
of the family and of the education of the children are chargeable
upon the property of both husband and wife, or either or them,
and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly and
separately." 37 A companion statute specifies the need for a
spouse to provide the other spouse with necessaries of life:

The earnings and accumulations of a married person are not liable
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14(I) cmt. b (1958). However, many courts still refer to the
marital relationship as an agency relationship. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 14(I) cmt. a (1958).
133. See generally 41 AM. JUR.2D Husband and Wife § 184 (1995). See also Citizens
& S. Nat'l Bank v. Parker, 245 S.E.2d 48, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (implied by statute);
Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So.2d 618, 620 (La. 1978) (expressly provided by statute).
134. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
135. Id.
136. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 (1997) ("Neither husband nor wife, as such, is
answerable for the acts of the other or liable for the debts contracted by the other ....").
137. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 (1997).
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for the debts of that person's spouse except for debts incurred for
necessary articles procured for the use and benefit of the married
person, his spouse, and minor children, taking into consideration
the earnings, resources, and general standard of living of such
38
persons.1

These two statutes clearly show that spouses must provide
necessaries of life to each other and to their family.
Montana defines necessaries of life broadly. The pertinent
statute defines necessaries as:
all such goods and services as are reasonably required to provide
for the health, welfare, comfort, and education of the married
person, his spouse, and minor children, taking into consideration
the earnings, resources, and general standard of living of such
139
persons.

The Montana legislature defined necessaries of life, but the
terms employed-health, welfare, and comfort-leave much
room for interpretation by the Montana Supreme Court. Yet,
the terms of this definition have never been interpreted by the
court. The court could apply Montana's statute to a domestic
violence situation, and the court could reasonably conclude that
the services rendered by an attorney to a victim of domestic
violence are necessary to provide for her health, welfare, and
comfort.
a. Health
A woman's health clearly depends upon freedom from
violence. In Montana, women are treated every day for physical
injuries inflicted by their spouses. While no Montana case
specifically defines health for purposes of the statute, Black's
Law Dictionary defines health as the "state of being hale, sound,
or whole in body, mind, or soul, well-being. Freedom from pain
140
or sickness."
Certainly, freedom from violence is essential to being whole
in body, mind, and soul. Freedom from violence is freedom from
pain or sickness.
One way to provide for health is to ensure proper medical
services to the domestic violence victim.
The Montana
legislature has no qualms about holding a batterer liable for his

138.
139.
140.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-205 (1997).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 (1997).
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 721 (6th ed. 1990).
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victim's medical care. 141 If the offender is able to pay, he must
pay the partner or family member's "reasonable actual medical
costs" and "counseling costs."1 42 Also, under § 40-2-106 and prior
case law, medical care is a necessary of life for which each
143
spouse is responsible.
A second way to provide for health is to ensure adequate
legal services for the domestic violence victim.
Unlike a
physician, who is limited to treating the wounds inflicted, an
attorney can attempt to end the infliction of wounds altogether.
An attorney may provide for the victim an order of protection
which can effectively stop the violence. An attorney can aid the
victim in dissolution proceedings which will in effect remove her
from her violent household. In this way, legal services play a
greater role than medical services in ensuring long-term health
and freedom from pain and sickness. Competent counsel
provides for the mental and physical well-being of the client.
It would be quite ironic if Montana law required a violent
spouse to pay for the medical services required by his spouse as
a result of the violence, but placed no liability on the batterer
for the legal services his spouse required to escape the violent
relationship. If this were the case, Montana law would actively
perpetuate the cycle of violence in Montana homes.
Fortunately, Montana's necessaries of life statute is capable
of providing a cure rather than a band-aid for the problem of
domestic violence. The statute is broad enough to encompass
spousal responsibility for attorney fees when one spouse's health
is threatened by the other spouse's violent acts. A spouse is
liable for "all such goods and services as are reasonably required
to provide for the health ...of the married person. . . ."'4 An
attorney's services, in the case of domestic violence, are
reasonably required to provide for the health of a married
person. As such, these legal services should be considered
necessaries of life.
b. Welfare
Again, no Montana case defines welfare for purposes of the

141. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(5) (1997).
142.
Id.
143. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 (1997); McQuay v. McQuay, 86 Mont. 535,
538-39, 284 P. 532, 533 (1930) (stating wife's medical and funeral expenses were
necessaries of life for which husband was liable).
144. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 (1997).
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statute. But an analysis of the necessity for an attorney's
services to provide for the welfare of a spousal assault victim is
essentially the same as an analysis of an attorney's provision for
the spouse's health.
Welfare may be defined as "well-doing or well-being in any
respect; the enjoyment of health and common blessings of life;
145
exemption from any evil or calamity; prosperity; happiness."
As previously argued, freedom from violence is a component of
health. Surely, freedom from violence also ensures "well-being,"
"exemption from evil or calamity," and "happiness."
An
attorney's services foster her client's welfare by promoting
freedom from violence, in the form of an order of protection
and/or a marital dissolution. As such, these legal services
should be considered necessaries of life.
c.

Comfort

Finally, comfort may be described as "benefit, consolation,
contentment, ease, enjoyment, happiness, pleasure, or
satisfaction." 146 As with health and welfare, the Montana
Supreme Court has provided no interpretation for this term.
Surely, freedom from violence is crucial to an individual's
comfort.
In a violent relationship, a spouse is effectively
deprived of ease, contentment, consolation, and other elements
of comfort.
When an attorney provides the legal services
necessary for a domestic violence victim to achieve a sense of
comfort, Montana law suggests that the services are necessaries
of life for which the violent spouse is liable.
d. Shelter
In the case currently pending before the Montana Supreme
Court, 1 47 the Missoula Family Violence Council argued that
shelter is a necessary of life in Montana and "a fundamental
requirement of shelter is that it be safe." 48
Safety may be ensured to the victim of spousal assault
through the issuance of an order of protection, or ultimately, a
marital dissolution. In the case of orders of protection, the

145. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (6th ed. 1990).
146. Id. at 267.
147. See Missoula YWCA v. Bard, No. 98-256 (Mont. filed July 8, 1998).
148. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Missoula Family Violence Council at 1, Bard
(No. 98-256).
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legislative intent was "to promote the safety and protection of all
victims of partner and family member assault, victims of sexual
149
assault, and stalking."
In order to advance the safety and protection of a domestic
violence victim through orders of protection or marital
dissolution, the services of an attorney are vital. The attorney,
in essence, provides the victim the legal tools to obtain shelter
without violence-shelter which is safe. As such, these legal
services are necessary articles for which a violent spouse must
be liable.
e. Procedure
Whereas § 40-4-110 impedes an award of attorney fees by
placing an undue burden on the domestic violence victim,
designating legal services as necessaries of life under § 40-2-106
allows an attorney to collect fees without excess hardship.
For instance, in McAlear v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission, the court designated the attorney's services as
necessaries of life after the attorney petitioned the court for a fee
award on that theory. 150 His clients were not required to attend
a separate hearing, thus the clients were not as personally
involved in the procedure. The necessity and reasonableness of
McAlear's fee request were for the court and the attorney to
address.
The spousal assault victim's attorney could separately
petition for a fee award under § 40-2-106. The attorney then
must show that she provided services reasonably required for
her client's health, welfare, and comfort. 151 The attorney could
provide an affidavit from her client stating the circumstances of
violence. Police reports, hospital reports, and previous orders of
protection, if available, could also substantiate the incidence of
violence. The husband would be permitted the chance to
149. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-101 (1997). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Missoula Family Violence Council at 3-4, Bard (No. 98-256).
150. See 145 Mont. 458, 463, 405 P.2d 219, 221-22 (1965). McAlear defended three
out-of-work loggers accused of fraud by the Montana Unemployment Commission. After
all three loggers were cleared of the fraud charges and received benefits, McAlear
petitioned the court for his fees. Id. at 462-63, 405 P.2d at 221-22. While McAlear was
not decided under MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106, the procedural aspects of McAlear are
relevant to a discussion of awarding attorney fees pursuant to the statute. For an
analysis of the case facts and the court's holding, see infra notes 185-190 and
accompanying text.
151. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 (1997). See also supra notes 136-146 and
accompanying text.
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challenge the allegations of domestic violence. However, he
would face an emotionally impartial attorney rather than his
fearful and intimidated wife.
The court would consider the facts of the case to determine
whether the attorney fees are necessaries of life. 1 52 The question
of domestic violence and the necessity and reasonableness of
counsel's assistance would be for the attorney and the court to
determine. If the services were deemed necessaries within the
meanings of §§ 40-2-106, and 40-2-210, the attorney could be
compensated without exposing the victim to unnecessary and
excess hardship and without infringing on due process
protections.
3. Case Law
a. GeneralNecessities: Edgerton and McQuay
Two Montana cases discuss spousal responsibility for
necessaries of life. 153 Analysis of these decisions shows that
each case supports the notion that legal services could be
designated as necessaries of life when rendered to provide for
the health, welfare, and comfort of a spouse. Consequently, the
court should be amenable to the award of attorney fees as
necessaries of life in certain domestic matters.
Edgerton v. Edgerton supports the idea that a husband
must provide for his wife's necessaries of life. 54 In Edgerton,
the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a lower court award of
maintenance to the wife. 155 In a lengthy discussion on common
law and equity court practices, the court explained that in
situations where a husband abandoned or drove his wife away
by his cruel treatment, an agency analysis 56 was inappropriate
and courts instead should rely on the "obligation of the husband
152. See McAlear, 145 Mont. at 463, 405 P.2d at 222.
153. See Edgerton v. Edgerton, 12 Mont. 122, 130, 29 P. 966, 967 (1892); McQuay v.
McQuay, 86 Mont. 535, 538-39, 284 P. 532, 533 (1930).
154. See Edgerton, 12 Mont. at 130-31, 29 P. at 972 (1892). This early case arose
prior to Montana's adoption of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and the right to a
"no-fault" divorce. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. Additionally, the case was
decided before the enactment of Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-210, which broadly defines
necessaries of life. Yet, Edgerton remains instructive regarding the court's attitude
towards the plight of a woman exposed to her husband's abuse and cruelty and her
struggle to support herself. See Appellant's Brief at 9-10, Bard (No. 98-256).
155. See id. at 149, 29 P. at 974.
156. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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to support his wife, even separate and apart from his habitation,
where by his conduct he had justified her separation . ".."157
The
158
husband's obligation to his wife was undisputed.
In deciding that the district court could enforce a
maintenance action against a "cruel" husband, the court
sympathized with the wife's situation. 159 The court explained:
When a husband turns his wife out of doors, without any
reasonable or just cause, or forces her to withdraw from him
without any means for her support, the law implies that he has
given her credit to supply herself with necessaries as are suitable
and proper for
her to have, namely clothing, boarding, and lodging,
160
and the like.

The Edgerton rationale implies that legal services may be
necessaries for which the violent husband is liable. While this
1892 decision enumerates as necessities clothing, boarding, and
lodging, it also deems necessary those items which are suitable
and proper. This language fits squarely with current statutory
law expansively declaring health, welfare, and comfort as
necessities of life. 16 1 Health, welfare, and comfort in one's home
are obviously suitable and proper. Freedom from violence in
one's marriage is certainly suitable and proper.
A second instructive case also supports the premise that
legal services may be necessaries of life for which each spouse is
responsible. 162
The Montana Supreme Court held that a
deceased wife's assignees could attach her husband's funds for
$839.00 in medical and funeral expenses due to contractual
obligations found within the marital relationship. 1 63 In its
analysis, the court stated that when a husband "neglects to
make adequate provision for the support of his wife, any other
person may in good faith supply her with articles necessary for
her support and recover the reasonable value thereof from the
husband." 164 The court reasoned that a wife's contracts for
necessaries of life are also the husband's contracts and thus his
obligations. 165 The court stated that the wife's medical and
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Edgerton, 12 Mont. at 131, 29 P. at 968.
See Edgerton v. Edgerton, 12 Mont. 122, 130, 29 P. 966, 967 (1892).
See id. at 149, 29 P. at 974.
Id. at 131, 29 P. at 972 (1892) (citations omitted).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 (1997).
See McQuay v. McQuay, 86 Mont. 535, 538-39, 284 P. 532, 533 (1930).
See id. at 540, 284 P. at 534.
Id. at 538, 284 P. at 533.
See id.
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funeral expenses were, without question, necessary articles for
166
her support.
The basis of this spousal liability for necessaries was the
husband's failure or refusal to provide necessaries. 167 Due to the
marital relationship, the husband had a legal and moral duty to
provide necessaries, and failure to do so created an implied
agency where the wife could bind the husband in order to obtain
items necessary for her support. 168 The court stated that the
agency was statutory, but the obligations to third parties arising
under the statute were contractual. 16 9 The Montana Supreme
Court upheld a spousal liability rule that "there is a contract for
the direct payment of money, which is unconditional as to time,
70
amount and the person by whom and to whom it is to be paid."
While McQuay, like Edgerton, was decided under a different
statutory arrangement and before no-fault divorce, the general
rule remains that a spouse is liable for the other spouse's
necessary expenses. 71 It stands to reason that when a spouse
fails to provide for the other spouse's support, a third party may
in good faith supply the necessary articles for that spouse.
Whether the party providing the necessary articles is a
physician or an attorney should be of no consequence.
The Edgerton and McQuay Courts faced an issue similar to
that facing today's court. The Edgerton court decided that, in
the case of abuse and neglect, a husband was required to provide
maintenance for his wife so that she may obtain things suitable
and proper for her existence. The McQuay court required a
spouse to provide articles necessary for the other spouse's
support.
A violent husband cannot be said to support his spouse with
the necessary articles of health, welfare and comfort enumerated
by the Montana legislature as necessaries. As a result, an
attorney should be able to supply the wife with tools to obtain
these necessities, and "recover the reasonable value thereof from
the husband." 172
166. McQuay, 86 Mont. at 538, 284 P. at 533.
167. See McQuay v. McQuay, 86 Mont. 535, 538, 284 P. 532, 533 (1930). At this
time under Montana common law and statutory law, the husband was primarily
responsible for providing necessary articles to the wife. See MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§
5784, 5800 (1921).
168. See McQuay, 86 Mont. at 539, 284 P. 532 at 533.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2-106, -205 (1997).
172. McQuay, 86 Mont. at 538, 284 P. at 533.
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Today the Montana Supreme Court should mandate spousal
obligation for necessary attorney fees just as the court required
spousal responsibility for necessary expenses in Edgerton and
McQuay. In the case of domestic violence, the violent husband
should be required to provide for legal services rendered to his
spouse so that she may obtain articles necessary for her health,
welfare, and comfort. In this way, the legal services themselves
become necessaries of life without which the domestic violence
victim may never leave her batterer and a cycle of violence.
b. Legal Services as Necessariesof Life
(i) Grimstad v. Johnson
The Montana Supreme Court has never designated legal
services as necessaries of life when rendered for dissolution
proceedings or in obtaining an order of protection for a domestic
violence victim. In fact, one early Montana decision refused to
173
award attorney fees in a divorce suit as necessaries.
In Grimstad, a wife's attorneys brought an action to recover
fees incurred while representing the wife in dissolution
proceedings before she reconciled with her husband. 174 The
Montana Supreme Court held that attorney fees were not
recoverable on the ground that the services were necessaries of
life. 175 If a husband neglected his wife, while the couple lived
apart the wife, as her husband's agent, could obtain necessary
articles from a third party who could then hold the husband
liable, 176 only if his wife abandoned him due to his bad
conduct. 177 However, the attorney fees could not be necessaries
173. See Grimstad v. Johnson, 61 Mont. 18, 24, 201 P. 314, 315-16 (1921). Neither
Appellant nor Respondent in Bard mentioned Grimstad in their briefs even though it is
the only Montana case dealing with attorney fees and divorce. See infra note 184. The
case was mentioned in Montana Legal Services' amicus brief. See BriefAmicus Curiae of
Montana Legal Services at 14, Bard (No. 98-256).
174. See Grimstad,61 Mont. at 19, 201 P. at 314.
175. See id. at 24, 201 P. at 315. The court also held that the attorney' fees were not
recoverable because counsel fees were only permitted while a divorce action was
pending, not after the fact. See id. at 23, 201 P. at 315. However, under MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-110, these professional fees may be recovered after entry ofjudgement.
176. See Grimstad, 61 Mont. at 23-24, 201 P. at 315. Again, the Montana Supreme
Court referred to an agency relationship between the husband and wife. See supra notes
132, 156-157, 168-169 and accompanying text. However, the husband was only liable for
necessaries if he had neglected to provide them for his wife. See Grimstad at 23-24, 201
P. at 315.
177. See Grimstad,61 Mont. at 23-24, 201 P. at 315.
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because it was never necessary for the wife to obtain a divorce,
"no matter upon what grounds she seeks it."178 Relying upon
section 3724 of the Revised Codes, the court stated:
The necessaries referred to in section 3724 are such as should be
provided by the husband for the wife to sustain her as his wife,
and not to provide for her future condition as a single woman, or
perhaps, the wife of another man. The duty to support the wife
grows out of the marital relation, and when the wife seeks to
dissolve this relation and set it aside, her want of funds to carry on
the litigation is in
no sense of the term a "necessary" for her
179
support as a wife.
Thus, under Grimstad, attorney fees in a divorce proceeding
were never necessary because divorce was never necessary.
Grimstad is an obstacle to designating legal services as
necessaries of life in dissolution actions. However, the case
should not control. Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, 80° today's court could not reasonably conclude that a
dissolution is never necessary, let alone unnecessary for a
spousal assault victim to escape a violent marriage.
By
following Grimstad, a wife would be locked into a violent
relationship with her husband by her inability to pay for the
legal services essential to her escape. In every sense of the term,
funds to carry on protection and dissolution proceedings are
necessary for her support and safety. A Grimstad rule is unjust
in the face of the serious problem that domestic violence poses to
Montanans. 181 Consequently, today's court should overrule
Grimstad insofar as it concludes that a dissolution of marriage
and corresponding expenses are never necessary for a wife's
support.

178. Id. at 24, 201 P. at 315.
179. See Grimstad v. Johnson, 61 Mont. 18, 24, 201 P. 314, 315 (1921) (citing MONT.
REv. CODE ANN. § 3724 (1921)). The court's language was identical to that of the 1886
Wisconsin decision of Clark v. Burke, 27 N.W. 22 (Wis. 1886), although the Montana
court cited no source. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
180. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, adopted in Montana, required no
traditional grounds for a dissolution of marriage. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 40, chs. 1, 4;
see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-107; State ex. rel. Marlenee v. Dist. Court, 181 Mont.
59, 592 P.2d 153 (1979).
181. Brief Amicus Curiae of Montana Legal Services Association at 14, Bard (No.
98-256).
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(ii) McAlear v. Unemployment Compensation Commission and
In re Marriageof White
Missoula YWCA v. Bard pits two prior Montana Supreme
Court decisions, McAlear v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission 8 2 and In re Marriage of White 8 3 against each
other. These cases addressed the issue of whether legal services
were necessaries of life.lM4 While neither case addresses divorce
or protection proceedings, each is imperative to a discussion of
these causes of action. McAlear supports legal services as
necessaries and White does not preclude the designation.
In McAlear v. Unemployment Compensation Commission,
Allen McAlear, a Bozeman attorney, rendered services to three
out-of-work loggers accused of fraud by the Montana
Unemployment Commission. 8 5 All three claimants were cleared
The
of the fraud allegations and received benefits. 8 6
Unemployment Commission denied McAlear's request for fees,
and McAlear appealed their decision to the Montana Supreme
Court on the grounds that his legal services were necessaries of
life for which he should receive compensation. 8 7 The court held
that McAlear, unfortunately, could not collect his fees because
he failed to give notice to the Commission regarding his
182. See 145 Mont. 458, 405 P.2d 219 (1965).
183. See 218 Mont. 343, 708 P.2d 267 (1985).
184. In Bard, both Appellant Jon Ellingson and Respondent Allen Bard analyzed
McAlear and In re Marriage of White at both the district as well as the appellate levels.
For the arguments presented to the District Court, see Reply Brief in Support of Motion
to Dismiss at 2, Ellingson v. Bard, No. DV 97-93 (Dist. Ct. Third Jud. Dist. filed Nov. 3,
1997); Supplemental Brief at 3:10-26, 4:1, Ellingson (No. DV 97-93); Supplemental Brief
in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1:20-25, 2:1-9, Ellingson (No. DV 97-93). For the
arguments presented to the Supreme Court, see Appellant's Brief at 11-15, Missoula
YWCA v. Bard, No. 98-256 (Mont. filed July 8, 1998); Respondent's Reply Brief at 2-6,
Bard (No. 98-256); Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, 6, Bard (No. 98-256). Ellingson reasoned
that under McAlear, his fees were necessaries of life, while Bard argued that In re
Marriageof White was determinative and the legal services were not necessary articles
for which he was responsible. See id. The district court agreed with Bard and concluded
that in a dissolution case In re Marriage of White controlled. Opinion and Order at 2,
Ellingson v. Bard, No. DV 97-93 (Dist. Ct. Third Jud. Dist. March 5, 1998). The issue of
whether the fees were necessaries now stands before the Montana Supreme Court. See
supra note 2.
185. See McAlear, 145 Mont. at 460, 405 P.2d at 220.
186. See McAlear v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 145 Mont. 458, 460,
405 P.2d 219, 220 (1965).
187. Id. at 462-63, 405 P.2d 219, 221-22 (1965). Under Montana unemployment
compensation law, a creditor might collect from a person's unemployment benefits only if
the debts were "incurred for necessaries furnished to such individual or his spouse, or
dependents during the time when such individual was unemployed." See MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 87-143 (Smith 1964).
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representation of his clients on a contingent fee basis. 8 8
However, the court determined that under the facts of the case,
the attorney's services should most certainly be considered as
debts incurred for necessaries. 8 9
The court finalized its
discussion by stating:
What are necessaries depends upon the facts of each case, and
stated another way, whether legal services are to be considered
'necessaries' depends upon whether there was a necessity for such
190
services.

In White, the Montana Supreme Court reasoned that legal
services were not necessaries of life. 19' In this case, the husband
argued, on the theory of necessaries of life, that his wife should
be liable for his attorney fees because they were incurred in
defense against her allegations of child abuse. 92 The husband
relied on § 40-2-106, which provides that each spouse is liable
for necessary family expenses. 93 Using limited and fact specific
language, the court held that "attorney's fees incurred by one
spouse to defend himself against child abuse charges are not
94
necessaries of life within the meaning of § 40-2-106, MCA."
Thus, the attorney services rendered by McAlear to three
unemployed loggers were necessaries of life, but the attorney
services White required to defend himself against child abuse
charges were not necessary. Why the different outcomes?
Montana's statute is decisive. 95 And in order to comply
with the statute, the facts of each case must be scrutinized.
That is where McAlear comes in.
McAlear, a 1965 decision, was decided before any statutory
definition of necessaries existed in Montana. 196
Absent
statutory intent, the court relied on decisions from several other
188. See McAlear, 145 Mont. at 464-65, 405 P.2d 219, 223 (1965).
189. See id. at 463, 405 P.2d at 222.
190. Id. at 463, 405 P.2d at 222.
191. See In re Marriageof White, 218 Mont. 343, 346, 708 P.2d 267, 269 (1985).
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Id at 346, 708 P.2d at 269.
195. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 (1997). See also supra notes 136-146 and
accompanying text.
196. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 was enacted in 1975.
See supra note
11.Presumably, McAlear, as an unemployment compensation case, would not have been
governed by the spousal responsibility provision. However, in the absence of any other
statute defining necessaries of life, it may be reasonably argued that the McAlear court
would have looked to the provision for some guidance when determining what
constituted necessaries.
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jurisdictions to decide when legal services were necessary. 197
For instance, the Montana court's language that facts must
drive the necessities determination was drawn from a Missouri
appellate court decision which dealt with attorney services
rendered to a minor. 198 Also, the court cited a California
appellate case where an attorney's fees rendered in proceedings
to restore a wife to competency over the husband's objections
were necessaries for which the husband was held liable. 199
Because McAlear's conclusion rested on varying fact situations
and statutes, its determination that facts drive what are
necessaries is appropriate.
Although McAlear was decided before the enactment of § 40200
2-210, and would not be governed by the family law provision,
it is not inconsistent with the statute. In fact, compliance with
Montana's statute mandates the implementation of McAlear's
requirement that the facts of each case be considered. In effect,
McAlear's conclusion sits squarely with the idea that necessary
articles are those goods and services essential to health, welfare,
and comfort. Put in the language of McAlear, whether legal
services are to be considered necessaries under §§ 40-2-106, and
40-2-210, depends upon whether an examination of the facts
shows that there was a necessity for such services.
Unlike McAlear, White was decided after the enactment of
§ 40-2-210, was governed by the provision, and is inconsistent
with the statute. Instead of relying on the applicable statute,
the court relied on a very limited definition of necessaries.
Citing Black's Law Dictionary, the court stated that necessaries
were "things indispensable, or things proper and useful, for the
sustenance of human life." 201 Then, relying on Edgerton, the
197. See McAlear v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 145 Mont. 458, 463,
405 P.2d 219, 222 (1965) (citing Caruso v. United States, 236 F.Supp. 88 (D.N.J. 1964);
Leonard v. Alexander, 122 P.2d 984 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Stone v. Conkle, 88 P.2d
197, 199 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939); City Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Sewell, 21 N.E. 810, 813
(Ill.
1889); In re Schulte's Guardianship, 1 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1941); Fenn v. Hart Dairy
Co., 83 S.W.2d 120, 124 (1935)).
198. See Fenn at 124 ("While it has been stated generally that attorney's services
are not to be regarded as necessaries, whether attorney's services are to be considered
necessaries or not depends on whether or not there is a necessity therefor.").
199. See Stone, 88 P.2d at 199 (stating that the rule that a husband is liable for
necessaries furnished by a third party to the wife, an incompetent, "is too well
established to require authority, and this is true irrespective of the fact that the husband
did not desire the services rendered or that he opposed the proceeding. The law imposes
the obligation and enforces it by a contract remedy.").
200. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
201. See In re Marriage of White, 218 Mont. 343, 346, 708 P.2d 267, 269 (1985)
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court limited this definition to "food, drink, clothing, and a
20 2
suitable place to live."

The court's analysis misconstrued Edgerton and ignored
McQuay and § 40-2-210. The Edgerton court defined necessaries
as those articles which were suitable and proper for the spouse
20 3
to have, "namely clothing, boarding, lodging, and the like."

Except for the exclusion of medical care, White's language is very
similar to one portion of the current Black's Law Dictionary
definition, 20 4 but it does not capture the broader notions of
20 5
suitable and proper as espoused in Edgerton.
Furthermore, by limiting necessaries to items like food and
drink, White ignores the McQuay decision which stated that
medical services fell within the classification of articles
necessary for the wife's support.20 6 In light of McQuay, Montana
case law fails to back White's limited version of what constitutes
necessaries.
Finally, and most egregiously, White failed to mention § 402-210.207

Unlike the White court, the Montana legislature

broadly defines as necessaries goods and services which are
reasonably required to provide for the health, welfare, comfort,
and education of all family members. 208 Unlike White, Montana
law does not provide a limited laundry list of necessaries for
which a spouse is responsible, and § 40-2-210 does not support
White's analysis.
As Montana case law and statutes do not support White, it
fails to uphold the proposition that legal services are never
necessaries of life. In fact, the dissent powerfully stated that the
legal services incurred by White were necessaries of life:
Appellant was charged and tried by a jury and acquitted of a most
grievous offense. His whole reputation and his future was on the
line and to not allow attorney's fees here is, in my opinion, a denial

(citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY

1181 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
202. See White, 218 Mont. at 346, 708 P.2d at 269 (citing Edgerton v. Edgerton, 12
Mont. 122, 131, 29 P. 966, 972 (1892)).
203. Edgerton, 12 Mont. at 131, 29 P. at 972. See supra notes 154-160 and
accompanying text.
204. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
206. See McQuay v. McQuay, 86 Mont. 535, 538, 284 P. 532, 533 (1930). See also
supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
207. The court based its decision on MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 but ignored its
interpretive companion, § 40-2-210. See supra notes 136-146 and accompanying text.
208. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-210 (1997).
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209

Although the dissent does not cite § 40-2-210 or McAlear, its
stance conforms more with Montana's expansive definition of
necessaries and McAlear's adherence to an examination of the
facts of each case.
If the majority of the White court would have considered
McAlear and § 40-2-210, would White's attorney fees have been
considered necessaries?
First, the facts must be considered. Necessaries of life
depend on the facts of each case. 210 While McAlear is noticeably
absent from the court's analysis, the White opinion is McAlear in
action. In McAlear and White, the attorney's services were
rendered to combat serious charges of fraud and child sexual
abuse respectively. 21' The facts of both cases may be examined
to illustrate their importance to a determination of when legal
services are necessaries. For instance, the McAlear facts were
damaging in that the denial of unemployment compensation put
general economic livelihood at stake. Thus, the legal services
were required to provide for vital financial interests. White's
reputation was at stake, not his livelihood. Here, the court
decided that his legal services were not necessary. 212 A factdriven analysis pushed the Montana Supreme Court to its factbased holding that White's defense against child abuse charges
213
leveled by his wife was not a necessary of life.
While considering the facts of each case was the last stop of
the McAlear court's analysis, it cannot be for White or any other
case involving spousal responsibilities. Instead, Montana law
requires that the fact examination shows the goods and services
provided to a spouse were reasonably required for a spouse's
health, welfare, comfort, or education. 214 Using this standard, it
may be argued that White's attorney fees were not necessary.
Admittedly, White's reputation may have been scarred, but this
may not have been the type of substantial credible evidence the
209. In re Marriage of White, 218 Mont. 343, 346, 708 P.2d 267, 269-70 (1985)
(Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. See McAlear v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 145 Mont. 458, 463,
405 P.2d 219, 222 (1965).
211. See supra notes 185-194 and accompanying text.
212. Although the White court did not mention public policy, it may be reasonably
suggested that penalizing the reporting of child sexual abuse allegations by assigning
responsibility for attorney fees may decrease the reporting of such incidents.
213. White, 218 Mont. at 346, 708 P.2d at 269-70.
214. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2-106, -210 (1997).
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court requires before awarding attorney fees. 215 Essentially, the
White court came to the right conclusion using the wrong means.
This conclusion is not fatal to every claim for attorney fees
as necessaries of life. The court, when correctly analyzing
Montana's expansive concept of necessaries in conjunction with
serious factual scrutiny, is likely to conclude that an attorney's
services may be necessaries for which a spouse is liable under
current Montana law.
For example, even if the attorney's services were not
considered necessary in White, the court could reasonably
conclude that they are necessary in a situation of domestic
violence. In White, the husband's safety and protection from
physical and mental assaults as proscribed by statute2 16 were
217
not at issue. Rather, his reputation was "on the line."
Contrast this with domestic violence situations where a husband
physically beats, and emotionally harasses and threatens his
wife, or cases such as Bard where a husband threatened to kill
his wife, and tried to stop her escape through calculated begging
and intimidation, often at her workplace. 218 Surely, a woman's
violent husband does not support her with the necessaries of
health, welfare, and comfort. And, surely the legal services
provided to ensure physical safety are necessities:
For if the Court concludes that legal services provided to protect
one's personal physical safety are not a necessity of life, then what
kind of legal services could ever be considered a necessity?...
Sometimes legal services may not be considered necessaries. The
typical business law services would not be. But where the services
of lawyer are provided to protect the physical health and safety of
a person, those services take on a different character. These
services must be considered
necessaries. And a spouse should be
2 19
fully responsible for them.

Freedom from spousal assault is essential to achieve health,
welfare, and comfort. The domestic violence victim may only
escape the violence and achieve true freedom by removing
herself from the attacks, distancing herself from her violent
husband.
In such an instance, it becomes clear that an
attorney's services are reasonably required to provide the victim
215. See supra notes 136-146 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 151-152.
216. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 (1997). See also supra notes 53-58, 94-98
and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 2.
219. Appellant's Reply Brief at 9, Bard (No. 98-256).
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with the necessaries she is entitled to under the obligations of
the marriage contract and Montana law.
V. LEGAL SERVICES AS NECESSARIES OF LIFE AND THE
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF PRO BoNo ATTORNEYS FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS

While the Montana Supreme Court supports a policy
220
favoring attorney fee awards for pro bono attorneys,
designating legal assistance in certain domestic matters as a
necessary of life will better guarantee that attorneys taking
these cases will be compensated. At a time when there is an
increasing need for pro bono representation, awarding fees
under § 40-2-106221 will increase the recruitment and retention
ofpro bono attorneys.
Montana Legal Services Association (MLSA) is often the
only resource available to a low-income victim of spousal
assault. "The majority of MLSA's clients require assistance in
family law matters, and they are often victims of domestic
violence." 222 The Congressional intention behind providing legal
services to low-income individuals is to increase their social and
223
economic opportunities and better serve the ends of justice.
However, decreased funding to MLSA has resulted in only 15
MLSA staff attorneys to serve approximately 180,000 eligible
Montanans. 224 Additionally, MLSA is no longer able to claim,
collect, or retain attorney fees, 225 thus exacerbating financial
hardship for civil legal assistance programs. Congress instead
requires MLSA to solicit private attorneys who will provide
226
adequate representation to low-income individuals.
As a result of substantial funding cuts at MLSA, the major
legal resource for low-income Montanans, the services of pro
220. See In re Marriage of Malquist, 266 Mont. 447, 456-60, 880 P.2d 1357, 1362-65
(1994), rev'd on other grounds, 279 Mont. 491, 500, 928 P.2d 214, 220 (1994).
221. See generally Part IV. See also notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
222. Brief Amicus Curiae of Montana Legal Services Association at 10, Bard (No.
98-256).
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1998). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Montana Legal
Services Association at 10-11, Bard (No. 98-256) (providing a summary of current status
of national and Montana Legal Services Associations).
224. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Montana Legal Services Association at 10, Bard
(No. 98-256).
225. See 45 C.F.R. § 1642 (1998). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Montana Legal
Services Association at 11, Bard (No. 98-256).
226. See 45 C.F.R. § 1609.1 (1998). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Montana Legal
Services Association at 10, Bard (No. 98-256).
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bono counsel are increasingly important. 227
Thus, the
availability of attorney fee awards is also of utmost importance.
These awards spur pro bono involvement.
Congress
acknowledged
this, when
recognizing
Legal
Services
Corporation's (LSC) stance that disallowing attorney fee awards
to private attorneys "would be a substantial impediment to the
228
recruitment ofpro bono lawyers."
Similarly, Montana case law supports a policy of awarding
attorney fees to pro bono counsel. 229 In Malquist, the Montana
Supreme Court held that the district court, pursuant to § 40-4110, may award attorney fees to a pro bono attorney providing
that the requesting party demonstrates necessity and
reasonableness of the fee.230 In stressing the importance of the
award of attorney fees in domestic relations cases, the court
aptly stated:
We live in a society where, next to health care, competent legal
service is likely the most essential, yet most costly, professional
service that most people from time to time require. That is
certainly no more evident than in domestic relations cases wherein
the court's decision will likely involve important property
questions and will forever alter the personal relationships and
obligations of the litigants to each other. More importantly,
however, at issue in many such cases are the relationships of
children to their parents and the fundamental rights of those
children to food, clothing, shelter, education, medical care,
support, and to a safe and reasonably stable home life. The
multiplicity of laws and often technical court rules and procedures
governing domestic relations cases combined with the emotionally
charged nature of such proceedings, present a mine field to the

227. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Montana Legal Services Association at 10, Bard
(No. 98-256).
228. This statement was made in the final rule restricting Legal Services
Corporation and private attorneys paid by Legal Services Corporation from seeking
attorney fees in cases after April 26, 1996. See 45 C.F.R. § 1642.4 (1998). See also Brief
Amicus Curiae of Montana Legal Services Association at 11, Bard (No. 98-256).
229. See In re Marriage of Malquist, 266 Mont. 447, 456-60, 880 P.2d 1357, 1362-65
(1994), rev'd on other grounds, 279 Mont. 491, 500, 928 P.2d 214, 220 (1994). In
Malquist, a father was held responsible for a portion of his child's medical bills
regardless of his child's receipt of his disability benefits and fundraiser money. See id. at
451-52, 880 P.2d at 1359-60. The court reversed the district court's award of fees to the
mother's attorneys and remanded for an evidentiary hearing when she failed to show
any evidence supporting the reasonableness of the fees to the district court. See id. at
454-55, 880 P.2d at 1362. The court concluded the case with a policy discussion of
allowing fee awards for pro bono attorneys. See id. at 455-60, 880 P.2d at 1362-65.
230. See id. at 460, 880 P.2d at 1365. However, the current statute does have
drawbacks for domestic assault victims. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying
text.
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231
litigant who is too poor to hire competent counsel.

The Montana Supreme Court's solution to this crisis was to
allow the award of attorney fees to pro bono attorneys. The
court reasoned that with the prospect of compensation, pro bono
attorneys would be "financially better able to provide more legal
services to the increasing numbers of indigent litigants who
need such services." 232
The court reiterated this policy
consideration when requiring a landlord to pay the fees of the
pro bono attorney who represented his tenant.233 The court
emphasized that providing equal justice to all mandated that,
when appropriate, attorney fees be awarded to individuals
234
represented bypro bono attorneys.
It may be hard to reconcile the notions of pro bono
representation and the award of attorney fees. The conflict
seemingly arises because
an attorney who provides
representation at no cost to the indigent client should receive
compensation in the form of a good work done, not a courtordered fee award. However, the reality is that for financial and
time management reasons, the two concepts are inevitably
intertwined. The Montana Supreme Court and several other
jurisdictions 235 have recognized this reality. These courts agree
that the potential of an attorney fee award increases the
likelihood that an attorney will take the case at no charge. A
mandatory award of attorney fees in domestic violence
situations will increase the chances of payment and the amount
of pro bono representation will increase accordingly.

231. Malquist, 266 Mont. at 456-57, 880 P.2d at 1363.
232. Id. at 458, 880 P.2d at 1364.
233. See Whalen v. Taylor, 278 Mont. 293, 304, 925 P.2d 462, 468 (1996).
234. See id. at 304, 925 P.2d at 468.
235. Montana is not alone in its reasoning. California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, and Pennsylvania, to name a few, recognize the
importance of awarding attorney fees to pro bono counsel. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569
F.2d 1231, 1244-47 (3d Cir. 1977); Ward v. Ward, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992); In re Marriage of Swink, 807 P.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Col. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing
reasonable fees to pro bono attorneys "encouraged greater lawyer participation.");
Benavides v. Benavides, 526 A.2d 536, 537-39 (Conn. 1987); Beeson v. Christian, 594
N.E.2d 441, 442-43 (Ind. 1992); Hale v. Hale, 772 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Ky. 1989)
(recognizing that private attorneys' financial considerations diminish time available for
pro bono activities and reasoning that fee awards would "make it feasible for competent
attorneys to represent, free of charge to their client, a needy or indigent person who
otherwise would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain representation in legal
matters."); Stackhouse v. Stackhouse, 484 N.W.2d 723, 445-46 (Mich. 1992); In re
Marriage of Gaddis, 632 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. App. 1982); Krassnoski v. Rosey, 684 A.2d 635,
638 (Pa. 1996).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

39

240

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 60 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 9

Vol. 60

This is good news for spousal violence victims. 236 If an
attorney knows that a case will generate compensation, the
attorney will more readily take the case at no charge to the
victim. A victim seeking an order of protection and/or marital
dissolution will be more likely to obtain the competent
professional service they require to deal with the "mine field" of
domestic relations law. Equal justice for indigent domestic
violence victims mandates that attorney fees be awarded as
necessaries of life to pro bono attorneys.
VI. CONCLUSION

Return to the situation of Anne and Roger. Roger was
required by law to pay the medical expenses resulting from
Anne's trip to the emergency room. Medical expenses are a
necessary of life for which Roger is liable, and the hospital is
likely to receive payment. Yet, the legal services that Anne will
require to stop the trips to the emergency room altogether are
not explicitly provided for in Montana.
Under Montana law, the necessaries of life for which each
spouse is responsible are defined broadly. Each spouse must
provide for the health, welfare, and comfort of the other spouse.
The Montana Supreme Court has been sympathetic to the plight
of the victim in the past and has reasonably determined that the
facts of each case should determine when a necessity for legal
services exists. The Montana Supreme Court should go one step
further to ensure indigent victims of spousal assault the
competent representation they direly need. The court should
designate legal services rendered to a domestic violence victim
as a necessary of life, the payment for which the violent husband
is liable.
The designation of legal services as necessaries of life will
mean that Anne may seek the services of a private pro bono
attorney to obtain either an order of protection or a dissolution
of marriage. The attorney will likely take her case, knowing, as
did the emergency room physician, that she will likely be
compensated after demonstrating that she provided for Anne's
health, welfare, and comfort pursuant to §§ 40-2-106 and 40-2-

236. For attorneys who are able to spare the time and expense of pro bono work,
this may also be good news for organizations assisting battered women. It is noteworthy
that in Bard, the petitioning attorney has allocated his interest in payment to the
Missoula YWCA Battered Women's Shelter. See Appellant's Brief at 2, Bard (No. 98256).
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210. As a result, Anne, with the assistance of competent legal
representation, is afforded an expanded opportunity to obtain
safety and justice.
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